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Pardons and the Theory of the “Second Best”
Chad Flanders*
This paper explains and defends a “second-best” theory of pardons. Pardons are
“second-best” in two ways. First, pardons are second-best because they represent, in part, a
failure of justice: the person convicted was not actually guilty, or he or she was punished too
harshly, or the punishment no longer fits the crime. In the familiar analogy, pardons act as a
“safety valve” on a criminal justice system that doesn’t work as, ideally, it should. Pardons, in
the non-ideal world we live in, are sometimes necessary.
But pardons are also “second-best” in another way, because they can represent
deviations from certain other values we hold dear in the criminal law: fairness, consistency, and
non-arbitrariness. Pardons, when they are given, can all too often reflect patterns of racial bias,
favoritism, and sheer randomness, both when they are given too generously or not generously
enough. So we need to have a theory of how the pardoning power should be used, even when it
is used to correct what are obvious injustices in the criminal justice system.
This paper both takes up the task both of showing how pardons are justified, but more
importantly, also gives a theory on when they should be used. It introduces two constraints on
the pardon power, one which constrains pardons when considered individually, and another
which constrains pardons when we consider them as a whole. It is this latter ground that has
been left mostly underdeveloped in the literature: we seem to know that pardons when given en
masse can be controversial, but we lack adequate terms to explain why they might be morally
problematic. This paper fills that gap in the literature, and in the process provides a general
framework for analyzing when various “second-best” moves are permissible in reforming and
correcting injustices in the application of the criminal law.
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I. Introduction
In January 2012, near the end of his term of office, Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour
gave some form of executive clemency (pardon, early release, or suspension of sentences) to
nearly two hundred people. 1 The move was nearly unprecedented in Mississippi, 2 although it
was later upheld by the Mississippi Supreme Court against a procedural challenge. 3 The
“pardons” – as I shall collectively call them, following most reporters -- were, and properly
remain, intensely controversial. 4 There was ample evidence that Barbour had “played favorites”
in handing out the pardons. Some of those pardoned had personal connections to the Governor
though the controversial Mississippi’s “trusty” program; 5 others Barbour pardoned were

1

Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour Pardons Nearly 200 People, Including Convicted Killers, CRIMESIDER (Jan.
11, 2012) available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57357252-504083/mississippi-gov-haleybarbour-pardons-nearly-200-including-convicted-killers/; Richard Fausset, Outgoing Gov. Haley Barbour’s Pardons
Shock Mississippi, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2012) available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/12/nation/la-nabarbour-pardons-20120113.
2
See Haley Barbour’s Shocking Pardon Spree: A Guide, THE WEEK (Jan. 13, 2012) available at
http://theweek.com/article/index/223306/haley-barbours-shocking-pardon-spree-a-guide (previous pardon high for a
Mississippi Governor was 13).
3
See Holbrook Mohr, Haley Barbour Pardons: Mississippi Supreme Court Rules Pardons are Valid, HUFF. POST
(Mar. 8, 2012) available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/haley-barbour-pardons-mississippi-supremecourt_n_1332769.html; In re Hooker, 87 So.3d 401 (Miss. 2012) (“[W]e are compelled to hold that—in each of the
cases before us—it fell to the governor alone to decide whether the Constitution's publication requirement was
met.”).
4
Fausset, supra note 1 (“The actions have brought criticism from victims' families, everyday Mississippians like
[local resident Terrance] Winters, and Democratic officials including Jim Hood, the state attorney general, who
persuaded a judge to put some of the pardons on hold.”).
5
“Trusties” were convicts who worked for the Governor, at his mansion, doing routine maintenance and
landscaping. The program has since been abolished by Barbour’s successor. Jessica Bakeman, Miss. Governor
Ends Controversial Mansion Trusty Program, USA TODAY (Jan. 20, 2012) available at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-20/mississippi/52694334/1. Barbour pardoned five
people with life sentences – including four murderers -- who had worked in the trusty program during his
administration. See Rich Phillips, Controversy Puts Mississippi’s Longstanding “Trusty” Program in Spotlight,
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“members of prominent Mississippi families, major Republican donors or others from the higher
social strata of Mississippi life.” 6 One individual pardoned was the cousin of football great Brett
Favre, who had been convicted of killing a friend in a drinking-and-driving accident. 7 Taken as
a whole, the pardons also showed a disturbing racial distribution. Nearly two-thirds of the
pardons during Barbour’s tenure were to whites, even though the majority of those convicted of
crimes in Mississippi are black. 8
In his public statements, Barbour gave only a vague theological justification for his mass
pardons, saying that Christians believe people can be redeemed and deserve a second chance. 9
He added that pardon board had recommended many, if not all, of those pardoned for executive
clemency. 10 In an op-ed written later, Barbour defended the tradition of pardoning trusties, and
asserting that those who commit crimes of passion such as murder are least likely to re-offend
and so are no longer a danger to society. 11 Four of the trusties Barbour pardoned had been
convicted of murder. 12
Such dramatic exercises of the pardon power such as Barbour’s raise deep and troubling
questions, not only about the pardons taken individually, but also about the justifiability of the
pardon power as a whole. When a governor pardons (an individual or a large group), he or she is
making an exception to the laws that apply to everybody. 13 Even pardons that look justifiable on

CNN.COM (Jan. 18, 2012) available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/16/justice/mississippi-trustyprogram/index.html.
6
Campbell Robertson & Stephanie Saul, List of Pardons Included Many Tied to Power, NY TIMES A1 (Jan. 28,
2012).
7
Judy Keen, Barbour’s Pardons Stir Outrage in Mississippi, USA TODAY (Jan. 13, 2012) available at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-12/mississippi-barbour-pardons/52511486/1 (“Among
those pardoned was Earnest Scott Favre, brother of former NFL quarterback Brett Favre. He pleaded guilty to
driving in front of a train while drunk in 1996, resulting in the death of his best friend.”).
8
Patrik Jonsson, Haley Barbour Pardons: Why Were the Forgiven So Disproportionately White? C.S. MONITOR
(Jan. 21, 2012) available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0121/Haley-Barbour-pardons-Why-were-theforgiven-so-disproportionately-white (“Out of a total of 222 acts of clemency given by Barbour during his tenure …
two-thirds benefited white prisoners. Meanwhile, two-thirds of the state's prison population is black.”); see also
Robertson & Saul, supra note 6, at A1 (“Yet in a state with the highest poverty rate in the nation, where nearly 70
percent of convicts are black, official redemption appears to have been attained disproportionately by white people
and the well connected.”).
9
“Christianity teaches us forgiveness and second chances. I believe in second chances, and I try hard to be
forgiving. The historic power of gubernatorial clemency by the Governor to pardon felons is rooted in the Christian
idea of giving second chances. I’m not saying I’ll be perfect, that no one who received clemency will ever do
anything wrong. I’m not infallible, and no one else is. But I’m very comfortable and totally at peace with these
pardons, especially of the Mansion inmates.” Haley Barbour, Statement on Clemency (Jan. 22, 2013) available at
http://www.governorbarbour.com/news/2011/dec/1.13barbourclemencystatement.html.
10
Id. (“My decision about clemency was based upon the recommendation of the parole board in more than 90% of
the cases.”)
11
Haley Barbour, Why I Released 26 Prisoners, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2012) available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-18/opinions/35439863_1_inmates-clemency-trusties.
12
Haley Barbour Pardons 4 Killers: Convicts Were Trusties at Governor’s Mansion, THE GRIO (JAN. 10, 2012)
available at http://thegrio.com/2012/01/10/haley-barbour-pardons-4-killers-convicts-were-trustees-at-missgovernor-mansion/.
13
Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1453 (2004) (arguing against executive discretion to reduce
or remove sentences on retributivist grounds); KATHLEEN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 28 (1997) (summarizing Kant’s opposition to pardons, given that rulers have a “categorical to punish
those who have committed crimes”).
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their face, because the prisoner has suffered enough or because the governor deems a sentence
against an individual to be too long or too harsh, violate the governor’s duty to be an impartial
administrator of the law. 14 Taken to an extreme, this argument would even limit an executive’s
ability to pardon in an error correcting capacity (say, if someone were actually innocent),
provided that the correct procedures had been used. 15
Barbour’s pardons also came at an inconvenient time: when there have been increasing
calls for executives – including and perhaps especially the President 16 – to increase the number
of pardons granted. 17 The pardon power has fallen in to disuse, perhaps in overreaction to
certain manifestly political uses of the pardon, such as President Clinton’s infamous pardon of
Marc Rich. 18 But Barbour’s pardons seem to show, in an elaborate and troubling fashion, how
mass pardons can go very wrong and would seem to condone, if not justify, executive hesitancy,
delay, and general over-caution in pardoning. 19
In this Article, I defend the pardoning power (especially against those who would find the
power itself always and everywhere unjustifiable) while finding that there are and should be
strong moral limits to when and how it can be used. To see how the pardon power could be
justified (and, as a result, individual instances of pardoning), we need to make a distinction
between ideal and non-ideal circumstances, a distinction I borrow and modify from the work of
John Rawls,20 and one closely related to the idea of the “second best.” 21
In ideal or near ideal circumstances, as I will be using the concepts, sentences are for the
most part just, and the criminal justice system works by and large in a fair manner. In a perfectly
ideal society, there would be virtually no need for pardons. But in non-ideal circumstances,

14

For an excellent statement of the tension between mercy (including pardons) and the rule of law norms of the
administrative state, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121
HARVARD L. REV. 1332 (2008) (“[T]he rise of the administrative state has made unchecked discretion an anomaly in
the law, and a phenomenon to be viewed with suspicion. The expansion of the administrative state has showcased
the dangers associated with the exercise of discretion.”); see also id. at 1333n. 5 (collecting sources on the tension
between mercy and justice).
15
See William Baude, Last Chance on Death Row, 34 THE WILSON QUARTERLY 18 (Autumn 2010) (defending
value of finality in criminal proceedings with application to the Troy Davis case).
16
See Dafna Linzer, Obama Has Granted Clemency More Rarely Than Any Modern President, ProPublica (Nov. 2,
2012), available at http://www.propublica.org/article/obama-has-granted-clemency-more-rarely-than-any-modernpresident (news story on infrequent use of pardons by President Obama).
17
See Clara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123 (2012) (arguing for greater use of
pardon power); Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. OF CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
1169, (2010) (“[P]ardon has important uses in the federal justice system, and recent experience has shown that a
president who fails to pardon regularly throughout his term will have difficulty dealing with pent-up demand at its
conclusion.”); Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED. SENT. REP. 153
(Feb. 2009) (calling for a “return to an era in which clemency is a key part of a functioning system of justice”). See
generally P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Pardon Power, http://www.pardonpower.com/.
18
Jessica Reeves, The Marc Rich Case: A Primer, TIME (Feb. 13, 2001) (details of controversial pardon of Marc
Rich).
19
See Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness, supra note 17, at 157 (noting political risks of pardoning).
20
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972).
21
Lawrence Solum, Second Best and Nonideal Theory (May 17, 2005) available at
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/05/legal-theory-lexicon-second-best-nonideal-theory.html (“Despite its
technical origins, the idea behind the second best is very general: sometimes the ideal solution to a problem [or
“optimal policy option”] is infeasible. The best should not be the enemy of the good; so, when the first-best policy
option is unavailable, then normative legal theorists should consider second-best solutions.”)
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sentences tend to be overly long and harsh or cruel, and the criminal justice system is biased
against certain groups. I think it fairly obvious that we (in America, and perhaps other parts of
the world 22) exist in non-ideal circumstances. 23 In such a context, pardons can be justified as
ways to more perfectly approximate what criminal justice would be like in ideal circumstances:
by limiting unjust sentences, say, or by removing unjustified post-conviction disabilities. This,
indeed, is how pardons are commonly justified in the literature. 24
This, however, does not end the enquiry, but only begins it. For it leaves open the
questions that there may be limitations on how the pardoning power can justly operate, even in
non-ideal conditions. For even non-ideal theory operates under some constraints, constraints on
how far we can relax certain moral absolutes so as to more perfectly approximate ideal justice. 25
If pardons are applied in a reckless and morally arbitrary manner, this may be impermissible,
even under non-ideal theory. This raises the interesting possibility that the way Haley Barbour
pardoned in general is unjustifiable, even if some (or all) of his individual pardons were fully
justified. It shows the possibility that not pardoning at all could be better in some cases than
pardoning in a discriminatory, biased, or random manner.
My paper seeks to define a consensus in some areas of the criminal law but to unsettle it
in others. In defending pardons, I present a theory that tries to provide a minimal account of the
pardon power which should be unobjectionable, or nearly unobjectionable, to most scholars of
the criminal law. Here I do not mean to court controversy, and I defend pardons on the
narrowest of grounds: as necessary to secure justice in particular cases and not as grand acts of
mercy. But in finding that pardons may be distributed in ways that are morally arbitrary, I open
up a new avenue for criticizing pardons -- as violations of equal treatment -- one which has been
previously underdeveloped in the literature. 26 Lastly, I join the chorus of voices that urge reform
of the criminal law and criminal punishment, but show that there are good reasons to think that
some reforms even when motivated by a desire for justice may themselves be morally
problematic.
My paper proceeds in three parts.

22

The United States has the highest prison population in the world, with China a distant second. See World Prison
Populations, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm.
23
See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (crisis of mass
incarceration in America); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (same); Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012) available at
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat_atlarge_gopnik (same).
24
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 14, at 1354n. 44 (collecting uses of the “safety valve” justification for pardons);
George Lardner & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in
Pardon Cases 1790-1850, 16 FED. SENT. R. 212 (Feb. 1, 2004) (importance of having a “safety valve” in system of
mandatory punishments).
25
RAWLS, supra note 20, at 246 (“Existing institutions are to be judged in the light of [the ideal] conception and
held to be unjust to the extent that they depart from it without sufficient reason.”)
26
Some have dealt with the problem of biased pardons, although they take a slightly different focus than I do.
Elizabeth Rappaport, Staying Alive: Executive Clemency, Equal Protection and the Politics of Gender in Women’s
Capital Cases, 4 BUFF. L. REV. 967 (2007) (suggesting a possible positive role for biased pardons, based on a theory
of “exemplary” pardons); Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power, 41 BRANDEIS L. J. 81, 117-124 (2002)
(possible Constitutional constraints on pardons based on gender or race).
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In the first Part, I examine a prominent theory of the pardoning power, that given by
Karen Moore in her important book, Pardons and in a related article. 27 Moore defends a narrow
view of pardons, which sees them as justified only when they are necessary to correct an
injustice in the administration of the criminal law. I find this view plausible, and in the second
part, I sympathetically present it. I also show that, surprisingly, that under Moore’s theory many,
if not all, of Haley Barbour’s pardons might have been justified.
In the second and longest Part, I examine the possibility that even though many of
Barbour’s pardons might be able to be justified individually, there may nonetheless be something
wrong with his pardons taken as a whole. Moore supports pardons as justifiable when done in
the light of an injustice in an individual case, given that our criminal justice system as it exists is
not fully just. But Haley Barbour’s pardons show that even pardons that correct individual
injustices in the status quo may still be, on another level, unjustified. This happens when
pardons are done in the wrong way, including when they are distributed in a morally
discriminatory, or morally arbitrary, manner. 28 This is the case, I believe, with Haley Barbour’s
pardons, and possibly with the pardons in the second Bush administration.
In the third Part, I extend the analysis of Barbour’s pardons into a larger point about
reforming the criminal justice system in non-ideal circumstances. There are constraints on
giving pardons that go beyond having them be based on good and sufficient reasons, constraints
that go to the proper distribution and implementation of pardons, and not just the fact that
pardons must be given for good and sufficient reasons. These types of constraints are constraints
on how reform in the criminal justice system can happen: even when we pursue just ends, such as
when we pardon those who have been sentenced unjustly, we must pursue them within some
limits.
I also present important qualifications to my thesis. Most importantly, my paper should
not be taken to promote the restrictive use of the pardon power. Rather, my point is simply this:
even if we should pardon more (and I think we should) there are, importantly, better and worse
ways of pardoning many people.
Throughout my essay, I used Barbour’s pardons as exemplary of a problem with
dispensing pardons on arbitrary or immoral grounds, where the pardons on a case by case basis
may be justified, but when taken as a whole, a troubling pattern emerges. Recent research into
the use of presidential pardons shows them also to be made on an arbitrary or possibly
discriminatory basis, 29 so the problem is not an isolated one. It shows a danger in the pardon
power in general, and points to the pressing need to develop more elaborate standards for the
proper use of that power. 30

27

KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989); Kathleen D. Moore,
Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 281 (1993).
28
This has obvious implications for the debate on “comparative desert.” See e.g., Ronen Avraham & Daniel
Statman, More on the Comparative Nature of Desert: Can a Deserved Punishment Be Just? (ms, Sep. 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146749.
29
See especially the excellent ebook produced by ProPublica, DAFNA LINZER & JENNIFER LAFLEUR, PRESIDENTIAL
PARDONS: SHADES OF MERCY (2012); see also Editorial, The Quality of Mercy, Strained , New York Times, Jan.
15, 2013, at , available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/opinion/sunday/the-quality-of-mercy-strained.html
(possible racial bias in Presidential pardons).
30
See also the recent pardoning controversy in South Korea. Choe Sang-Hun, Departing South Korean Leader
Creates Furor With Pardons, NY TIMES A8 (Jan. 29, 2013) (“With less than one month left in office, the departing
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II. A Defense of the Pardoning Power
The pardon power has long been controversial in itself, and not only the occasions of its
use. 31 I sketch out below, briefly, one influential understanding of when pardons are and are not
justified given by Karen Moore in her book an in an important later article. Moore defends
pardons narrowly, as necessary to correct serious injustices in the legal system. Moore’s view
of the pardon power is strict, and on some accounts might not amount to a theory of executive
“mercy” at all, if by “mercy” we mean judgments based on whim or caprice or compassion
rather than based on reasons. 32
Moore defends pardoning, then, but she does not defend the pardon as an unfettered right
of the executive to forgive crimes, a gift that falls on those the sovereign happens to favor (the
traditional view which was arguably in the background of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
ruling upholding Barbour’s pardons 33). Rather, the executive must pardon only for “good and
sufficient reasons,” reasons relating to the offender’s culpability, and to the proportionality of the
offender’s punishment. A pardon cannot be given simply because the executive wants to give
it. 34 It must be morally justified.
While we might think that Barbour’s pardons could only be defended on the traditional
view (where the sovereign has an absolute right to pardon), I show in this part that they might
also in principle be defended under Moore’s view. For it could turn out that Barbour had, in
Moore’s terms, “good and sufficient reasons” to pardon each offender: one offender’s sentence
might have been too harsh, for instance, or another offender might have been wrongly convicted.
To see whether they were justified, we would need to examine each case separately, on its own
merits.
A. Moore’s Theory of Pardons

president of South Korea, Lee Myung-bak, granted special pardons on Tuesday to political allies, a longtime friend
and dozens of others who have been convicted of corruption and other crimes.”)
31
See generally, Markel, supra note 13.
32
See Markel, supra note 13, at 1436 for a definition of mercy along these lines (“Mercy I define first as the
remission of deserved punishment, in part of in whole, to criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics that
evoke compassion or sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the offender’s competence and ability to choose to
engage in criminal conduct.”). Markel would more likely categorize Moore’s defense of pardons as a defense of
“equitable discretion.” Id. at 1440.
33
The Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling was made on narrow, separation of powers grounds, but the idea that the
executive’s decision was unreviewable by any other branch certainly suggests a power that is accountable to no
other body. One of the dissenters was more explicit about the roots of the pardon power. See In re Hooker, at ¶ 141
(Pierce, J., dissenting) (“[T]he power to pardon … is an act of the sovereign’s ‘mercy and grace.’”) See also Moore,
Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 282 (“The pardoning power of the great monarchs of
seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe was analogous in theory and practice to divine grace. Like grace, the
freely given, unearned gift of divine favor, a royal pardon was thought of as a personal gift. Therefore, it required no
justification and was not subject to criticism”)
34
Kathleen D. Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27.
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Moore, in her book, and in an important follow-up article, 35 defends the pardoning power
as an extension of retributive justice, 36 although I (as I explain) do not believe adopting her
theory means adopting retributivism tout court. 37 Retributive justice, on her view, means
punishing offenders because they deserve it. But in an imperfect system of criminal justice,
offenders may not always get what they morally or legally deserve, and so need to be pardoned,
either by being released or by having their sentences reduced. As Moore writes, “A pardon is
justified when the procedures miscarry, giving the state a legal, but not a moral, license to
punish.” 38
What exactly, “procedures miscarry” means here is ambiguous, and Moore does not
exactly clarify in her article (her book employs different concepts), and so I do not pretend to be
strictly following her here. 39 For procedures can miscarry in a strictly legal sense, where a judge
misapplies the sentencing guidelines, say, and gives an offender a higher sentence than is legally
allowable. This would presumably be grounds for reversal by an appellate court, but could also
presumably be the basis for a pardon “for good and sufficient reasons,” if all avenues for appeal
have been exhausted. Here the procedures that have miscarried can be deemed to have done so
using only legal standards, that is, standards that are internal to the legal system itself. In other
words, in cases like these, the legal system has not performed their functions correctly. 40
But procedures might miscarry in other ways, not because they are not followed, but
because when they are followed they lead to the morally wrong result. An innocent person may
be convicted even though all the proper legal procedures have been followed. This happens, and
there may be no legal error we can directly point to. 41
Suppose, for instance, that the evidence that exists at the time of the trial leads a jury to
convict someone of a crime. 42 Every appellate court also subsequently upholds the conviction.
Nonetheless, many years after the trial, new evidence comes to light that clearly exculpates the
convicted person, his available legal avenues for appeal now thoroughly exhausted. Here the
procedures have nonetheless miscarried, not in the sense they were not followed, but because
they led to the wrong result. From a point of view external to those legal procedures, we can see
that something has gone wrong, even though in a strictly legal sense, nothing has. 43
In this case, nonetheless, a pardon is justified, because the reason for the legal procedures
is to protect the innocent. But those procedures have not done this. To prevent a (morally, but
not legally) innocent person from being punished is a “good and sufficient reason” to pardon,
says Moore.

35

MOORE, PARDONS, supra note 27; Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27.
MOORE, PARDONS, supra note 27, Part II (“A Retributivist Theory of Pardons”).
37
See infra note 46.
38
Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 286.
39
In particular, I believe that there are cases when the state does in fact lack a legal basis for punishment, and where
a pardon is therefore justified. I give an example of this shortly in the text.
40
More precisely, the actors in the legal system may have failed to perform their functions correctly.
41
See Baude, Last Chance on Death Row, supra note 15.
42
I borrow this example from Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 286.
43
As a result, we can imagine a theory of pardons that justifies them only in cases of strict legal error (the rules have
not been followed correctly), but not in cases of moral error (where the procedures have been followed, but the
result is morally wrong).
36

8

Or more controversially, suppose that a sentence handed down, while perfectly legal, is
nonetheless, by some recognizable moral standard, too harsh or unfair. 44 If this is the case,
although the state may legally punish that person a certain term of years, it has no moral basis to
do so. That person may have his sentence permissibly reduced by an act of executive mercy,
according to Moore. 45 How to decide when a sentence is too harsh is a complicated question,
which Moore does not attempt to answer (nor will I attempt to do so at any length, here). 46 But
we might intuitively agree that some sentences, in principle, might be too harsh for an offender
given his crime, or given other factors. In those cases, the executive has a “good and sufficient
reason” to reduce the sentence, or to end it altogether.
In general, says Moore, “pardons should be used as part of a broader constitutional
scheme to ensure that sentences are assigned justly.” 47 This can happen when the legal
procedures miscarry in an obvious way (the judge who has misapplied sentencing guidelines), or
in a less obvious way: when the punishment is not consistent with the values that underlie the
criminal justice system as a whole, of protecting innocence, or of assigning punishments that are
proportional to the offense. “Procedures miscarry” when the legal system does not follow its
own rules, or when they do not lead to results that are consistent with the values implicit in its
procedures, such as fairness or avoiding cruel and unusual punishments. The pardoning power is
used for “good and sufficient reasons,” in short, when it upholds the values that are at the basis
of a just constitutional scheme.
B. An Objection Briefly Considered
This, again, is not the place to present a fully worked out theory of pardons; here, I mean
to borrow Moore’s theory, for the most part, in order to test the question of whether even if
pardons taken individually might be for good and sufficient reasons, they might be unjust when
taken as a whole. This will be my main contribution to the debate over pardons, and I pursue it
in Part II. But here I want to consider an objection to Moore’s theory that will help us flesh it out
a bit.
That objection is that Moore’s theory is not really a theory of pardons at all. A theory of
pardons, the objection goes, should specify those places where the executive can permissibly
exercise mercy. But the above cases show no such thing; rather, they show cases where the
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George W. Bush’s pardon of Scooter Libby was arguably of this sort. See Michael Lindenberger, The Quality of
Mercy: Don’t Jump on Haley Barbour All at Once, TIME (Jan. 17, 2012) available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2104577,00.html (“Presidents have also commuted sentences they
feel are too harsh without removing the taint of the conviction. President George W. Bush did just that when he
commuted the sentence of Scooter Libby, Dick Cheney's former chief of staff. ‘I respect the jury's verdict,’ Bush
said at the time. ‘But I have concluded that the prison sentence given to Mr. Libby is excessive. Therefore, I am
commuting the portion of Mr. Libby's sentence that required him to spend 30 months in prison.’”).
45
Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 287.
46
Moore defines harshness in retributive terms, as being a sentence that exceeds the offender’s desert. MOORE,
PARDONS, supra note 27, at 93, 97-98. But one could also imagine it being defined in other theoretical terms: a
harsh sentence could be one that no longer had any utilitarian point (it didn’t deter other offenders, or rehabilitate the
offender), or that caused too much suffering. On this last point, see the illuminating remarks in David Gray,
Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1691-92 (2010).
47
Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 286.
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executive must act, so that he or she is morally required to stop the injustice. Moore’s theory of
pardons makes pardons mandatory and not permissible. 48
But I do not see it as an objection to a theory of pardons that it diagnoses at least some
acts of pardon as morally mandatory. Indeed, there are certain cases, I think, where Presidents or
Governors are morally required from stopping a grave injustice from being done. It would be a
flaw in a theory if it could not identify these instances. A pardon that a Governor is morally
required to give -- say of a person who is actually innocent of his crime -- is not any less a
pardon for that.
We might worry, still, that on Moore’s theory, there are only mandatory acts of
pardoning, that there is no place for discretion on whom or when to pardon. Even if this is so,
this may not be a decisive objection to it being a theory of pardons (in short, I do not think that
pardons must contain only permissible acts 49). But there is still something we can say to this.
First, it will usually be a fuzzy matter what punishment it is, exactly, that an offender deserves.
Does every offender who commits a wrong deserve to be arrested, to be prosecuted, to be given
this sentence, and no other? Always? I do not think we can give any determinate answer to
these questions. 50 When an executive decides that a person’s sentence is more than he deserves,
he is acting with some discretion, in the same way that many other actors in the process have
acted with discretion. When the executive makes this decision, he may not be morally obligated
to act in a certain way (to pardon or not to pardon); there may simply be no fact of the matter as
to what the offender deserves in this case.
Indeed, the executive has a certain advantage in the process, because he comes at a later
stage: he or she can see how the offender has responded to the punishment, whether conditions
have changed so that the offender no longer deserves the original punishment, or has reformed
him- or herself. 51 No matter which overarching theory of punishment we believe in, the
executive has more information about whether those purposes are being accomplished, or
accomplished in a fair way. 52 The governor, say, can see if the punishment is still useful, or just,
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Antony Duff makes a version of this point in his review of Moore’s book. See Antony Duff, Review Essay/Justice,
Mercy, Forgiveness, 9 CRIM. JUSTICE ETHICS 61 (1990) (arguing that, in some cases, Moore’s theory renders
pardons “necessary or obligatory, not merely permissible.”).
49
This may be the place to again emphasize that I am interested in pardoning not in mercy. Mercy may necessarily
be a discretionary act, tied to any reason or no reason at all, and be something that “someone has neither a natural
nor a legal right to claim—it is bestowed on the offender—perhaps like some understandings of grace.” Markel,
Against Mercy, supra note 13, at 2004. This may be true of mercy, but it does not seem to me to be true of pardons.
In some cases, a person may have a right to a pardon (because, for example, she he innocent, and cannot achieve
vindication in any other way but an executive pardon). For a similar distinction (between mercy and equity) see
Stephen P. Garvey, Is it Wrong To Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319
(2004).
50
I make this point about the indeterminacy of desert at length in another paper, How Retribution Fails (manuscript
on file with author). See also the excellent paper by Alice Ristroph on the same point: Desert, Democracy, and
Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293 (2006).
51
See Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1501 (2000).
52
Even on a retributive theory, it seems incorrect to say that we can learn nothing about an offender’s act after he
had committed it: we may learn about his culpability, or his character, only later. The idea that we have perfect
knowledge of offender’s competence or ability to choose at the time of trial seems to me a fallacy. Of course, new
evidence can be found after a trial is concluded, which would also give obvious grounds, on retributive theory, for
changing or removing the sentence.
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or deserved. There is still an enormous space for judgment here; as I said, I doubt there is a clear
answer to the question of who deserves clemency and who does not. So even on Moore’s theory,
there is room for saying that some pardons are permissible, and some are mandatory.
C. Justifying Haley Barbour’s Pardons

I want to withhold any further objections to Moore’s view, for the time being, although I
should be clear that I find her account rather persuasive. If there are flawed moral or legal
judgments in the criminal justice system, a pardon is one way that those judgments can be
corrected, and corrected in the name of the values of the legal system itself. The question I want
to deal with now is this: can such a narrow view of pardons justify Haley Barbour’s pardons, or
does it instead show why they may be illegitimate?
The answer to this question is, I think, rather straightforward on Moore’s view, although
perhaps in other respects unsatisfying: we can only tell if we look at the pardons one at a time,
and see if they are supported by “good and sufficient reasons,” in Moore’s phrase. 53 If some
sentences were incorrectly imposed, then Barbour was right to pardon those who received those
sentences. If some other legal, procedural rule were not followed, then that case, too, would be
eligible for a pardon. In short, the analysis under Moore’s theory is individualistic, rather than
holistic. 54 We don’t have to look to any other pardon to see whether a pardon in an individual
case was justified or not.
It is unlikely that there were many such “legalistic” pardons granted by Barbour; indeed
if there were any at all; Barbour would have wanted to draw attention to these pardons. More
probable is that Barbour gave many “moralistic” pardons. Some, Barbour may have rightly
believed, had suffered enough from their punishments, or faced collateral consequences from
their punishment that were no longer warranted (if they ever were). Certainly this could have
been the case for those who were given early release for medical reasons (although Barbour
defended these pardons, rather cynically, in terms of saving the state money 55).
In particular, Barbour may have felt that others had been given too long sentences, even
if those sentences were legally and properly arrived at under the criminal code of Mississippi.
For example, the summer before his departure from office, Barbour commuted the sentences of
two African-American women who were sentenced to life for an armed robbery that netted a
total of eleven dollars. 56 In the case of Earnest Scott Farve, (the relative of Brett Farve), Farve
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As some of the early news reports conceded.
For a related, but more technical use of these terms see Thomas Hurka, Desert: Holistic and Individualistic,
manuscript available at http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~thurka/docs/desert_hi_rev.pdf (distinguishing between
desert in an individual case and desert across cases, and calling the later way of looking at desert “holistic”).
55
Barbour, supra note 9 (“Half of the people who were incarcerated and released were placed on indefinite
suspension due to medical reasons because their health care expenses while incarcerated were costing the state so
much money. These individuals suffer from severe chronic illnesses, are on dialysis, in wheelchairs or are
bedridden.”) Barbour did go on to say that these people no longer represented threats to society.
56
Patrik Jonsson, Did Haley Barbour’s Pardon Spree Go Too Far? C.S. MONITOR (Jan. 11, 2012) (“Last summer,
Barbour was hailed by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People as a “shining example” for
commuting the life sentences of two African-American women who had spent 16 years in prison for an armed
robbery that yielded $11.”).
54
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was originally sentenced to one year house arrest for his crime, but had that increased to a
suspended fifteen year sentence “after he left his house to go fishing.” 57 In these three cases,
Barbour (we can guess) thought that the resulting sentences were simply too harsh, and so a
pardon was warranted.
More compelling still, Barbour may have believed that some suffered from the stigma of
their criminal conviction, and that this was too much: they had, in his view, suffered enough
from their crimes. They deserved the right to be able to apply for a job without the stigma of a
past felony conviction, or to reclaim their right to vote, or to hunt. 58 Indeed Barbour made this
last point explicit in his remarks defending his pardon. 59 Especially if we believe such things as
felony disenfranchisement are per se unjust and immoral as punishments, 60 a pardon designed to
negate this feature of Mississippi sentences would seem to be one that is done for good and
sufficient reasons.
In short, I find it hard to argue against the supposition that at least some of Barbour’s
pardons were justified under Moore’s analysis. Probably at least of the sentences were cases
where the state had a narrow legal right to punish, but the punishments were in fact morally
unjustified. Barbour, on Moore’s view had the power to pardon in these cases. Some of the
cases, though, were probably not cases of pardons for good and sufficient reasons: they were
based on ties of friendship, or because of lobbying, or some other non-morally salient reason.
They could not be based on good and sufficient reasons.
Suppose, then (even if counterfactually), that all of Barbour’s pardons were done for
“good and sufficient” reasons. We would have to tell and long and detailed story about how this
was so. We would have to say which punishments were too long, or who (if anyone) was
wrongly convicted. We might have to tell a story about how some punishments, such as the
taking away the right to vote for convicted felons, are never permissible, so that removing those
punishments via an act of clemency, would be justified. If we could tell a story that gave a good
and sufficient reason for each of Barbour’s pardons (and again, I doubt that we could), then there
would be no objection to them, at least on Moore’s view.
But I want to register a sense of uneasiness about this conclusion, a sense that goes
beyond the suspicion that not all of Barbour’s pardons could be individually justified. My
argument in the remainder of the paper will be that, even if all of the pardons granted were done
for good and sufficient reasons, there can be problems with a Governor’s pardons taken as a
whole. That is, we have to analyze the justifiability of pardons on two levels: first, on the level
of the individual pardon; and second, on the level of all the pardons granted by an executive.
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Id.
See, on this score, the op-ed by Molly M. Gill, Why Did Governor Haley Barbour’s Pardons Cause Such a
Backlash? HUFF. POST (Jan. 19, 2012) available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/molly-m-gill/haley-barbourpardons_b_1217237.html (“What is it about former Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour's pardons that irk us so
much? It can't be because 189 people who were already out of prison and obeying the law will have better job
prospects and restored civil rights because he pardoned them.”)
59
“The pardons were intended to allow them to find gainful employment or acquire professional licenses as well as
hunt and vote.” Barbour, supra note 9.
60
See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004) (discussing the Constitutionality and morality of laws
disenfranchising felons).
58
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There can be objections to the pardoning power that appear only, or at least most clearly, on the
wholesale level. It is to these objections that I now turn.
III. Problems with Pardons En Masse
The general thrust of Moore’s view on pardons is this: there can be flaws in the system of
criminal justice that lead to results that are not consistent with the underlying (for Moore,
retributive) values of the criminal justice system itself. 61 Insofar as an executive can pardon to
correct those flaws, his pardon is justified. As we saw in the last part, this means that there
seems to be no in principle reason why all of Barbour’s pardons might not have been justified, as
a means of correcting morally flawed sentences. To see whether or not this was true, we would
have to look at each pardon, taken one at a time.
In this part, I raise some doubts about the moral sufficiency of this approach. For there
may be groups of pardons, all of which could be justified individually, but which might still be
morally wrong taken together. I first provide some cases, where intuitively, a group of pardons
raise some moral questions. I then, after each case, try to explain why these moral questions
might render some pardons as a whole unjustified, or at the very least problematic. I conclude
this Part by showing that Barbour’s pardons could be morally questionable in precisely these
ways.
A. Some Problematic Pardons
1. Racist Pardons
A Governor in a southern state, decides to commute 62 the sentences of four murderers on
death row to life in prison without the possibility of parole. He does this, he says, because he
believes that the death penalty is deeply immoral and inconsistent with the rule of law; and let us
suppose, just for the sake of argument that he is right about this. 63 The death penalty is an
unjustified and unjustifiable act of punishment, and so anytime the state does it, it is deeply in
the wrong. So on Moore’s account, pardons for those on death row would be pardons for good
and sufficient reasons, for I presume that preventing some from being given a deeply immoral
punishment is (if anything is) a permissible reason for a pardon.
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Dan Markel makes a related argument about the values of the criminal justice system and of liberal democracy in
justifying certain exercises of clemency. He limits his focus, however, to the death penalty. See Dan Markel, State,
Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40
HARV. C.R-C.L. REV. 407 (2005). I raise some questions about Markel’s argument (and other arguments like his) in
my paper, The Case Against The Case Against The Death Penalty (unpublished ms, on file with author).
62
I will sometimes refer to these commutations as “pardons,” just for ease of reference. But technically, they are
commutations, not pardons.
63
The case here bears some resemblance to Governor George Ryan’s commutation of death row in Illinois, which
has been much discussed in the legal literature. See Markel, supra note 61, for citations. I should be clear, however,
that nothing hangs on the particular example; indeed, I have my doubts that the death penalty is in fact per se
immoral.
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But there is a catch. There are eight other people on death row in his state who the
governor has decided not to pardon. He makes a vague promise that he will pardon the others
later, when it is politically feasible, but he is at the end of his term, and his announcement of the
four pardons has engendered considerable controversy. He will most likely not pardon any of
the others.
Moreover (and this is the real problem), it turns out that the four he has decided to
remove from death row are all of the same color. They are white, and the remaining nonpardoned death row inmates are black. Indeed, this seems to be the only obvious difference
between those the Governor has pardoned and those he has not; no meaningful distinction can be
manufactured from the different crimes the convicted murders have committed; all were grisly
and gruesome, and all were convicted at roughly the same time. The governor mumbles
something about having no awareness of the race of those whom he pardoned (“I just saw
names” 64). But the fact is, the Governor’s pardons were at best been selective and at worst
implicitly racially motivated.
Here we have a case where the four pardons taken individually are done for good and
sufficient reasons. Each white person pardoned is pardoned because his sentence of death was
(we are supposing for the sake of argument) was immoral. But the problem is that the pardons
were not comprehensive, or consistent; or rather, if they were consistent, they were consistent on
the basis of race. The governor did not pardon all of those who he had a good and sufficient
reason to pardon.
Does this render the pardons he has given illegitimate? I think there is a strong case that
it would. The pardons while justified individually are on the whole distributed in a racially
unfair way (I bracket for now the question of whether it matters whether this was done
intentionally or accidentally, a question to which I will return). So there is a norm that may
govern the granting of pardons that appears only on the level of pardoning en masse, which we
can call an anti-discrimination norm. 65 Pardons that are distributed in a racially discriminatory
manner are not permissible, even if the pardons considered individually are justified by good and
sufficient reasons. How we understand the force of this norm, I think, is open to debate. 66 But I
think something like that norm exists, and underlies our intuitive reaction to the “all white”
pardons scenario.
2. Pardoning “Favorites”

64

This was, in fact, a justification offered for the color-blindness of Barbour’s pardons – that race was not listed on
the application for pardon. See Patrik Jonsson, Haley Barbour Pardons: Why Were the Forgiven So
Disproportionately White? C.S. MONITOR (Jan. 21, 2012) available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0121/Haley-Barbour-pardons-Why-were-the-forgiven-so-disproportionatelywhite (“A majority of the clemency cases were reviewed by the Parole Board before being sent to Governor
Barbour,’ Barbour spokesperson Laura Hipp told Reuters, which conducted an analysis of Barbour's pardons. ‘Race
was not a factor in his decision. In fact, it wasn't even listed on the Parole Board's application.’”)
65
Although my intuitions change if the governor had announced that the four black members of death row were to
be pardoned, but not the eight white members. This shows that the norm operating might be anti-caste, and not
purely anti-discrimination. For a discussion of the anti-caste principle, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976).
66
We might wonder, for example, whether the norm is specifically an anti-racism norm, or one more tied to nonarbitrariness or respect more generally.
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Suppose we make this one, small change to the hypothetical: the people the Governor
pardons are not all of the same race, but they do share something else in common: (a) they are
friends of friends of the Governor, or (b) they have hired professional lobbyists to make their
case to the Governor, or (c) they are veterans of the Governor’s “trusty” program, 67 or (d) they or
their relatives are high-profile donors to the Governor’s campaign. 68 So, on this hypothetical,
instead of pardons that are based on race (or that happen to be given to members of the same
race), we have selective pardons to those with connections of some sort or another to the
Governor. Again, let us say that there are four people (out of twelve) who get pardoned, and all
of them have this relevant feature. Once more, we are assuming that the death penalty is an
immoral punishment, so that those four who are pardoned, have a good and sufficient reason to
be pardoned.
Are these pardons nonetheless morally problematic? I would again say yes, of course,
and for a similar, though not identical, reason to the pardons that we based on race: they pick out
a non-morally salient characteristic (closeness to governor) as a basis for distinguishing between
like offenders. Here the characteristic is possibly not as bad as race (given the fraught history of
race relations in America, and especially the South), and may be less invidious than choosing on
the basis of race. But it still seems wrong to show favoritism to those lucky enough to be friends
of friends of the Governor, or who have the money to hire a lawyer to lobby the Governor. So I
think it is wrong to show favoritism in pardoning, and I think that this wrongness puts into
question the justifiability of the pardons, even though the pardons taken individually have “good
and sufficient reasons” to support them. Call this norm against selective pardoning, the antifavoritism norm.
3. Random Pardons
Take many of the same facts from the two previous hypotheticals: a governor decides to
pardon some, but not all, of those on death row, because it would be too politically unpopular to
commute all of their sentences. But this time he does not choose on the basis of race or family
(or happens to distribute his mercy only to those of a particular race or with family ties), rather,
he decides to hold a lottery, commuting the sentences of the four who win the lottery. Again, let
us suppose that the death penalty is a deeply immoral punishment, and the state is never justified
in imposing it on anyone. So a commutation of a person’s death sentence is always justified, for
preventing someone from suffering an immoral punishment is always a good and sufficient

See supra note 5 (explaining the trusty program).
Again, this seems to have been the case with many of Barbour’s pardons. Campbell Robertson & Stephanie Saul,
List of Pardons Included Many Tied to Power, NY TIMES A1 (Jan. 28, 2012) (“Yet in a state with the highest
poverty rate in the nation, where nearly 70 percent of convicts are black, official redemption appears to have been
attained disproportionately by white people and the well connected.”); id. (“Mississippi’s pardon system, like those
in other states, rewards applicants who have both the financial means and the connections to seek reprieves
aggressively.”)
67
68
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reason. For each person on death row who “wins” the lottery, consequently, there was a good
and sufficient reason to have his sentence commuted. 69
Does it make better that the selective outcome of the lottery is random, rather than based
on the racist or “favoritist” choices of the Governor? I think it makes them more acceptable, but
still not acceptable all things considered. For while the norms against racial discrimination or
favoritism are not violated, another norm is (of which the norm against racial discrimination and
favoritism may be instances): the norm against unequal treatment. The governor is not treating
like cases alike; instead he is just choosing arbitrarily, based on nothing more than a random
lottery. Those who do not win the lottery can complain that they have been unfairly treated,
because there is nothing that makes their case different than those who have won.
Or can they? I confess to feeling more ambivalent about this case, an ambivalence that
was absent in the previous, race-based and favorite-based cases. Those who win the lottery have
not benefitted from racial discrimination or from family ties. Instead, those who win the lottery
get a gift, one that those who lose the lottery do not: and each had an equal shot at getting the
gift. Is the implication of the norm against arbitrary treatment that unless all get the pardon, no
one can? Do gifts have to be distributed equally, or not at all?
I think they do, at least in the case of pardoning. For what the lottery system resembles is
nothing so much as the old version of the sovereign’s right to pardon: where the sovereign can
decide how to pardon (for any reason, or for no reason at all) just because he is the sovereign. 70
This seems inconsistent with a system that asks its officials, at all levels, to act according to rule
of law values like consistency and uniformity. So although this is a closer case, I conclude that
pardons that are made on an arbitrary manner are problematic, even if those pardons taken one
by one, can be justified by good and sufficient reasons. 71 They violate the norm against arbitrary
treatment. 72
At the same time, I need to qualify this (and I will return to this qualification later, in Part
III of the essay). For it seems that here, more than in the previous cases, we might want to weigh
more heavily the wrongness of the underlying punishment: in this case, an immoral and unjust
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A similar example is introduced in Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 13, at 1464, but for different purposes. The
classic thought-experiment of chance and the criminal law is David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something
to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 53 (1989).
70
See supra note 30 (pardon power as exercise of the sovereign’s power).
71
Avraham and Statman argue that the race case differs from the random case, because in the race case one has been
disrespected, but not when one has been randomly favored or disfavored But my intuitions differ here: why isn’t a
matter of disrespect to decide desert questions on the basis of a lottery? Why wouldn’t this, as well, show a
disrespectful attitude towards the offender’s fate? Wouldn’t it also suggest a possible trifling attitude towards
questions of desert and justice? Avraham & Statman, supra note 28, at 8.
72
It is important to note that not all selective pardons are arbitrary. A favoritist method of selection and a random
method of selection may be objectionable, but not a method that, say, selects whom to pardon based on the fact that
some of those on death row committed less gruesome crimes than others, or that some convicts were more reformed.
See, on this point, Stephen Nathanson, Does It Matter If the Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily Administered?, 14 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS, 153 (1985) (“For example, though we may acknowledge the impossibility of ticketing all speeding
drivers and still favor ticketing some, we will not find every way of determining which speeders are ticketed equally
just. Consider the policy of ticketing only those who travel at extremely high speeds, as opposed to that of ticketing
every tenth car. Compare these with the policy of giving tickets only to speeders with beards and long hair or to
speeders whose cars bear bumper stickers expressing unpopular political views. While I shall not pursue this point in
detail, I take it to be obvious that these different selection policies are not all equally just or acceptable.”). Selective
pardons made for efficiency reasons, too, could be justified – indeed, even if a lottery was used to make the choices.
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execution. It may be that that wrongness would be sufficient to outweigh the wrong done by a
random pardon (however we might specify that wrong). This may suggest that we are always
doing an implicit balancing between the harm of the wrong (unjust, harsh) punishment and the
harm done by the pardon being racist, biased, or random. It was only that in the cases of racism
and favoritism, it seemed clearer that those wrongs were more possibly worse than the wrong of
the unfair punishments (or at least the unfair punishments of those who were lucky enough to be
pardoned). Our calculation could be more complicated still if it was a question of pardoning
some who had been wrongly convicted by a lottery, and not pardoning any.
4. Pardons for the Wrong Reasons
Now consider a final twist on the above example. Let us suppose that the governor now
commutes the sentences of all twelve members of death row. So there is no question of unfair or
arbitrary treatment of any of them; they all get their sentences commuted, no one is excluded for
any reason. But there is again a catch. The reason, this time, that the governor pardons all of
them, is that they are (similar to the case of favoritist pardons) friends of friends. He cannot get
them out of prison altogether (that would be politically infeasible), but he can prevent them from
being executed.
The death penalty is still, as we have been suggesting for the sake of argument, a deeply
immoral penalty, so that it is never justified that someone be put to death for a crime they have
committed. So the pardons in fact consistent with good and sufficient reasons for mercy,
because it is a good and sufficient reason to prevent someone from receiving an immoral
punishment.
But this, of course, is not the reason the Governor gives in commuting the sentences. He
says he is commuting their sentences because it is traditional to pardon members of the “trusty”
program. 73 Or it could even be that the Governor says he’s pardoning good and sufficient
reasons (the immorality of the death penalty), but his real reason is because of the personal
connections he has with the inmates. Moreover, unlike the previous three cases, the Governor
has given all twelve of the death row inmates pardons, so that his treatment of them is not in any
way “selective.” To use Kant’s helpful terminology, the Governor in this case is pardoning
according to duty, but he is not pardoning from the motive of duty. 74 His pardons just happen to
be coextensive with the pardons he ought to be giving.
Is there anything wrong with the pardons in this case? I think there is, because the
professed reasons the Governor gave don’t match up with the proper reasons, and the professed
reasons are not, in fact, good and sufficient reasons for pardoning. To put it another way, there is
a disconnect between what would justify the commutations, and what in fact did justify them for
the Governor. What justified the pardons for the Governor was that the people who had their
sentences commuted had a personal connection to him. But (we are supposing) it turns out that
73

Barbour, supra note 11 (“This was not a new thing. For decades, Mississippi governors have granted clemency to
the inmates who work at the mansion. I followed that tradition four years ago and did so again at the end of my
second term. No one should have been surprised.”); Barbour’s past pardons of trusties were no less controversial.
See Bob Herbert, The Mississippi Pardons, NY TIMES (Oct 15, 2010).
74
See, e.g., the exposition of Kant in Barbara Herman, On the Value of Acting from a Motive of Duty, 90 PHIL.
REVIEW 359 (1981).

17

those who had a personal connection with him also were justified in having their sentences
commuted.
Still, it was in some sense a matter of sheer chance that those who are no longer on death
row in fact should not have been on death row in the first place. They got off ultimately because
of their connection to the governor (and the Governor’s subsequent favoritism), not for the “good
and sufficient” reasons that were available to justify their commutations. 75 It just happens that
all twelve had this characteristic this time, rather than just four of them.
So in short, we’ve eliminated the selectivity of the pardons, but reintroduced another
problem, related to, but not quite the same as the problem of favoritism. The problem is that the
reason why the Governor gave the pardons isn’t the reasons he should have given. I am not sure
exactly what to call this disconnect, but for the sake of convenience, let us say that there is a
sincerity constraint on pardoning: the actual reasons for pardons have to be the good and
sufficient reasons for the pardons, no other reasons will do. 76 It seems to me the weakest form of
wrongdoing that can be committed in a mass pardons case; it also seems to me that this type of
wrong will usually not be unaccompanied by some actual favoritism that leaves some without
pardons who deserve to be pardoned. 77
B. Barbour’s Pardons Revisited
At the time of Barbour’s pardons, there was widespread outrage. 78 Part of this, indeed
probably most of it, was because of individual pardons: the murderers or the drunk drivers who
were pardoned when the wounds from their crimes were not yet healed. 79 But I also think there
was a larger disillusionment with Barbour’s pardons, which came not from analyzing each case
one at a time and deciding that the pardon in that case was not warranted. After all, it seems very
likely that some of the pardons were justified by good and sufficient reasons: the ones who
needed medical release, for example, or those who were convicted long ago for minor drug
possession, and who wanted to be able to vote, or have an easier time getting a job.
Yet many condemned the pardons as a whole and I think the above section explains why
this might have happened. Consider the anti-discrimination norm. Two thirds of those Barbour
pardoned were white, while two thirds of the Mississippi prison population is black. 80
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Overwhelmingly, then, you had a better chance at a pardon if you were white than if you were
black. This at least gives the appearance that the anti-discrimination norm was being violated, if
not intentionally, at least as a matter of discriminatory effects. Indeed, the pardons might have
been part of a deeper, structural racism in the entire process of pardoning, from the
recommendation by the parole board for pardons to the granting of the pardons themselves. So
even if Barbour did not knowingly pardon more whites than blacks (he was not aware of the race
of those he pardoned), the pardons may still have been the product of racism, and so problematic
for that reason. 81
There might have also been the perception that the pardons were arbitrary, that they were
simply indiscriminately given. The person that Barbour happened to get to know as a trusty was
pardoned, but one who did similar service, and committed a similar crime, was not. Or a
convicted criminal who was able to get the Governor’s ear because he had a relative working for
Barbour might have gotten a pardon, but one who had no connections to Barbour did not. Or
still further, someone who could afford to hire an attorney to lobby Barbour got a pardon, but
someone without money and an attorney does not.
Pardons that are given on such an indiscriminate or random basis might be thought to be
unfair, because they treated those who are similarly situated differently based on morally
arbitrary factors. 82 It turns it into a matter of mostly chance whether you would be pardoned or
not: whether you, or someone close to you, knew someone who could get the Governor’s ear.
But chance shouldn’t be the deciding factor. The only deciding factor should be whether there
were good or sufficient reasons for your pardon. In other words, the reason for the pardon
should be the good and sufficient reason for the pardon, and not any other reason.
So people may have been reacting to the apparently arbitrary nature of many of Barbour’s
pardons. They seemed not to have been made in any sort of orderly or reasoned manner. 83 Even
if many of those pardoned were pardoned for good and sufficient reasons, there may have been
others who were not, but who should have been, because there were also good and sufficient
reasons for pardoning them. 84 It at least looked as if Barbour might not have been being entirely
consistent in choosing whom to pardon.
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But with Barbour, it was worse than simply appearing inconsistent. For the pardons
Barbour made didn’t seem to be made merely on the basis of chance but were instead made for
reasons of the wrong sort. They were made because of connections to the Governor, whether
these were personal, familial, or the result of lobbying. It wasn’t as if Barbour held a lottery to
see who would get pardoned; this would still be unfair, but the unfairness might be of a lesser
kind. Rather, the people who got pardoned (it seemed) had a connection to the Governor. In
fact, it was as if the main factor in many cases was the existence of this connection. 85 It would
have been better if the pardons had been entirely random; still morally problematic, but better.
If this was true in many cases, and not just one or two, then this provides another reason
for criticizing the pardons as a whole, even if they can be justified case-by-case. For if the mode
of distributing the pardons is not just arbitrary, but based on favoritism, then the pardons as a
whole may be problematic, not because there are not good and sufficient reasons for them (we
are assuming there might be) but because of the way they are given out. A bad mode of
distribution (connections to the governor) might put into question all of the pardons, even
pardons that could have been justified for good and sufficient reasons. 86
C. Some Recent Presidential Pardons
A recent, searching report by the public interest group ProPublica has raised questions
about presidential pardons, which reflect, on a smaller scale, the problems that were noted in
relation to Barbour’s pardons. 87 The two conclusions of the study, which were reported in the
Washington Post, was that the pardons granted by George W. Bush heavily favored whites, and
that “political influence … continued to boost pardon applicants.” 88 The study conducted by the
authors was based on a random sample of five hundred people out of the nearly two thousand
people who had requested pardons during the second Bush’s presidency. 89
The number pardoned by Bush during his entire presidency was 189, a little less than the
total number that Barbour pardoned in the final days of his governorship. 90 Yet they seem to
reflect writ small what Barbour’s pardons display writ large, viz., that when taken as a whole,
pardons can be problematic in a way they are not when they are taken individually. The authors
at ProPublica shows this point by a series of careful comparisons, between, say, a white woman
who attempted to defraud the IRS of more than $25,000 who got a pardon, and an AfricanAmerican beauty shop owner who was convicted of underreporting her income, who was not. 91
They also investigate, in detail, a case where a donation to a Congressman helped secure a lastminute pardon. 92
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Those in the Bush administration expressed surprise at the result, and insisted that the
process was “color-blind.” 93 And we may think that the real problem here is the paucity of
pardons (something that has continued with a vengeance into the Obama administration 94), and
not necessarily their basis, a point which I return to in Part III. There may also be problems of
what are legitimate criteria for selecting people for pardons, a point of possible disagreement.
The Bush administration’s officials apparently took marriage as a key factor in signaling whether
someone had been rehabilitated or not, as showing greater “stability.” 95 But they also looked to
more amorphous factors such as “attitude,” something which might open the door to all sorts of
bias, or might which give wiggle room to favor some over the others based on political
pressure. 96 There was, in fact, one instance of obvious racial bias in the Bush’s consideration of
a pardon from a Nigerian minister. 97
A final, notorious example might also be worth mentioning. In 2007, George W. Bush
commuted the sentence of I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, saving Libby from having to serve two and
one half years for his role in leaking the identity of Central Intelligence Agent Valerie Plame. 98
In his remarks defending the pardon, Bush said that a thirty-month prison sentence for Libby was
“excessive.” 99 Reportedly, Vice President Dick Chaney was furious that Bush did not give
Libby a complete pardon (Libby was still on the hook for a $250,000 fine and remained a
convicted felon). 100 Although many conservatives felt that Libby’s fine was a miscarriage of
justice (liberals disagreed), it seems clear that without Libby’s close connection to the President
and the Vice-President he would probably not have been even a candidate for a pardon. In short,
whatever the individual merits of the Libby case, it certainly was a pardon based on favoritism.
And it seems fair to say that in many other cases, and not just in the Libby case, Bush’s
pardons were as problematic as Barbour’s were. Even though they may have been granted, in
most cases, for good and sufficient reasons, the way they were pardoned showed problems:
problems of bias, or of favorable treatment, or of sheer arbitrariness. They show why a theory of
pardons needs to regulate more than just individual pardoning, but the pardoning process as a
whole, because sometimes why a pardon is wrong cannot be discovered in isolation, but only
when compared to other instances of pardons granted or not granted.
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IV. Toward a Second Best Theory of Pardons
The second and third Parts of this paper, taken together, frame a dilemma that arises in
many real-world cases of pardoning. On the one hand, some pardons will be clearly justified by
good and sufficient reasons. So, for example, an executive will be justified in pardoning when
an innocent person has been convicted and sentenced, or when the sentence is too harsh. But on
the other hand, if an executive pardons only some of those he has good and sufficient reasons to
pardon, and the basis on which he does so is selective along some forbidden ground (race or
favoritism) or is done randomly, even individually justified pardons can become morally
problematic. The result is cases such as the ones we examined in the last Part: where even
facially “good” pardons, when distributed on a “bad” basis, become suspect. In an ideal world,
an executive would pardon all those who should be pardoned, and not make choices on whom to
pardon for invidious or arbitrary reasons.
But this is not always what happens, and so we need a way to assess when pardons are
both good and bad: good because they sometimes serve individual justice, bad because they also
involve some other unfairness. To do this, I employ in this Part John Rawls’s language of
“ideal” and “non-ideal” theory a distinction closely related to the idea of “second-best” theory.
Pardons are non-ideal or second best in two ways. First, they are second best, because in an
ideal world, we would never need to pardon: the laws would be fair, and the sentences given
would be justice.
But pardons can be second best in another way, too. They can be given out in ways that
don’t accord with our considered notions of fairness, or non-discrimination, or non-favoritism.
The prevailing justifications of the pardoning power have focused too much on the way pardons
can correct individual mistakes in the criminal justice system; but they have taken too little
notice of the way in which pardons can introduce new kinds of injustices. So we have to be able
to judge pardons along both individual and collective lines, and to explain how sometimes
individual pardons can be unjustified for reasons that are unrelated to the justice of the particular
case. This is what I hope, in introducing the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, to
give us the tools to do.
A. Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory
The idea of “ideal theory” was developed by John Rawls, in his now-classic Theory of
Justice. 101 Rawls used the term to structure his political philosophy as a whole. What he was
going to do, he said, was to sketch out his picture of an ideal society, a “realistic utopia,” 102 as
he would call it: a society which was, as much as it was possible for humans as they were,
perfectly just. In doing so, he would make certain assumptions, one of which (the key one,
actually) was that everyone would comply with the law. 103
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If this is criterion (i.e., total compliance) is taken as the sine qua non of ideal theory, then
there cannot be a full ideal theory of criminal justice. 104 If people obey the law, they will never
be tried or punished, and so we will not need a complete understanding or description of the
institutions of criminal justice. This explains, in part, Rawls’s focus in his book on problems of
distributive (and later, social) justice and his almost complete disregard of questions of crime and
punishment. 105 Fortunately, however, we can find a use in Rawls’s distinction between ideal and
non-ideal theory.
We can still speak, almost in ordinary language terms, of ideal theory as that which
comes close to embodying, or embodies, our idea of a perfectly just society. We can then speak
of our society, in contrast, as a non-ideal one. The main point I want to borrow from Rawls is
this: the rules that govern a non-ideal society will be different than those that govern the ideal
society, because there may be some things we need to do to get to the ideal that may no longer be
permissible once we live in the ideal society. 106 Rawls’s book itself is short on examples, and
here is no exception, but he gives some in this context. He considers the possibility that slavery
or serfdom, given some economically distressed regimes, could be permissible for a time, until
securing the basic liberties was economically feasible. He also proposes that certain restrictions
on democracy could be justified as a matter of non-ideal theory. 107
Rawls’s first point in these examples is that in certain circumstances, ideal theory can’t
govern a society directly, because if it did, that society would never get to the ideal. We would
starve before we got to the point of having a functioning constitutional democracy. In a way,
non-ideal theory says that you can break the ideal rules. But Rawls also has a second point,
which is this: even when it departs from the ideal, non-ideal theory must aim at the ideal. Nonideal has to take ideal theory as its guide, because, after all, the point of breaking the rules is to
get us closer to the ideal of the ideally just society. Ideal theory constrains non-ideal theory not
absolutely, like strict rule, but more like a standard that the non-ideal society tries to
approximate. 108
But then the puzzle becomes: how do we determine when departures from the ideal rules
are permissible and when they are not? We could imagine one extreme, saying that they were
never permissible, but this would just be to reject the possibility of non-ideal theory. At the
other extreme would be to simply give up on the idea of ideal theory and just simply balance on
each occasion. But it seems that we need a conception of what we aiming for in order to give
content to our balancing, so this extreme seems unpalatable as well.
There can be no general answer to this puzzle. The notion of “ideal theory” is at the end
of the day a useful metaphor, to think about how to reform society for the better. Should we
think mostly in terms of aiming towards an ideal society? Or should we think instead in terms of
eliminating obvious injustices? 109 In the case of pardons, I think it is best to think in terms of an
ideal we are aiming for: the ideal that we have a criminal justice system that both operates fairly
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for all and does not unjustly punish anyone. So we have to ask, what measures can we use to
arrive at this ideal, without sacrificing the ideal in the process? Ideal theory helps us show what
is at stake when there are pardons that are done for morally arbitrary reasons, like race or
favoritism: they show that there may be something wrong with a pardon, even if that pardon in
the individual case is done for good and sufficient reasons.
B. Applying Non-Ideal Theory to Pardons
Barbour’s pardons were not universally condemned. Some praised Barbour’s conversion
from a strict law-and-order man, to one who was capable of forgiveness, showing his Christian
side. 110 Others, including the prominent civil rights lawyer John Payton, hailed Barbour’s large
number of pardons as (merely) putting a dent in mass incarceration. The main problem was that
Barbour had not gone far enough. His pardons were only a drop in the bucket, Payton said. 111
Payton’s perspective is important, because it puts Barbour’s pardons in the larger context
of the injustice of America’s criminal justice system as a whole. It is almost universally agreed
that too many people are in prison, for too long, and for relatively minor offenses. Recent
declines in the prison population only serve to highlight how far we have to go. Moreover, the
stigma and the harms of those offenses last well beyond their release from prison: they suffer
hardships in receiving aid, getting jobs, and being able to vote. 112 Again, it is very probable that
some if not all of Barbour’s pardons were done for good and sufficient reasons. And again, most
of the offenders were not ones that were just released from prison; rather they had been released
for years, had reformed themselves, and were trying to get under the burden of a past conviction.
This is in a way to repeat what I suggested in Part II of the paper: that there were
probably many of Barbour’s pardons that could have been justified by good and sufficient
reasons, if he wanted to. But we should emphasize that if these pardons were so justified, they
were, according to Moore, matters of justice. It was unjust that these people should have
suffered from their sentences, and it was a matter of justice that Barbour should pardon them.
The Barbour pardons were at least in some cases done in the interests of making sentences just.
Then how could they be at the same time wrong? Here I need to step back and make a
larger point about progress towards an just society which is not limited to Barbour’s pardons.
Suppose that we lived in an ideally just society, where the criminal law was just and fairly
administered. In this society, all or nearly all trials would result in the conviction of the guilty,
and the guilty would be punished according to their desert. 113 Still, we can imagine that there
would be some mistakes in the administration of justice, where people slipped up, not necessarily
intentionally, but as a matter of simple human error.
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In this case, where we errors are relatively infrequent, we might see the importance of the
pardon power as patching up some of the flaws in the system, in order to take a mostly or nearly
just society closer to being a perfectly just society. Pardons are one way of doing this. Other
places of discretion, in the hands of the police, the prosecutor, or the jury, could also work to
“patch up” flaws. 114 Pardons and these other measures would be, as many have stated, necessary
“safety valves” to the workings of the criminal justice system, to account for human fallibility.
Note, however, that these would be entirely legalistic pardons, in Moore’s use of the term. They
would be pardons when human actors failed to follow (to the letter) the hypothetically just laws
and punishments.
Now suppose we live in a far from ideal society, where the many criminal laws
themselves are irrational or unjust, where sentencing is on the whole too harsh, where mandatory
minimums are the norm, and where the consequences of being imprisonment carry harms far
past the date of release. In such a world, which I take it is very near (or identical) to our world,
the use of “safety valves” would be especially important, 115 and we might actively call for
greater use of them, such as Paul Butler’s case for greater jury nullification, 116 or pleas for
governors to pardon everybody on death row. 117 What’s more, the use of these would be in
many cases amply justified as a way to mitigate, if not eliminate, much of the legal harshness of
the criminal justice status quo. Barbour’s pardons can certainly be seen as doing this, at least
partly, even if it is only a drop in the bucket. It is probably true that in our society, as many have
argued, the pardon power should be used more often and more aggressively than it is currently
being used. 118
The problem is that although pardons (and the like) can be used as means to achieving the
substantively just society, there comes a point when the use of that means conflicts with the ideal
of the just society. This is what, arguably, happened in the case of Barbour. It does not do any
honor to the idea of a racially fair justice system to reinforce that bias by pardoning,
disproportionately, members of the white race. And it does not support the idea that justice is
non-arbitrary to assign pardons in a seemingly random and scatter-shot manner. Further, a just
criminal law is not promoted when the law is found to bend in favor of family, or in favor of
those with money.
The larger point is that the way the criminal justice system is patched up, or reformed,
must be on the whole consistent with the values of an ideal criminal justice system. This seems
especially important when those reforms are made in a large-scale manner, as was the case with
Barbour’s pardons. In short, there are constraints on acting justly in pursuit of a more perfectly
justice society. These are the constraints that, to use John Rawls’s terminology, ideal theory
places on actors in the real world.
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This means that if pardons are to be given, they should ideally be given for good and
sufficient reasons, and should only be distributed because of those reasons. That means that they
cannot be distributed in other ways, ways that might be racially biased, or arbitrary, or based in
favoritism. If they are distributed in these ways, they go against the larger ideals of criminal
justice, and for that reason, are morally suspect, if not morally impermissible.
Of course, in the real world, pardons will never be perfectly fair. Like cases will not
always be treated in a like matter. Some arbitrariness seems inevitable in a system administered
by human beings and not by machines (it will also be very difficult, if not impossible, to
compare cases along a common metric). This should not be a barrier to allowing any pardons, as
I explain in greater detail in the next section. It is only when the moral arbitrariness is so large as
to be obvious that it becomes a problem, when there does not seem to be any semblance of
following a uniform procedure, or uniform standards for offering pardons. This means that even
if in one sense pardons are permissible violations of rule of law values (such as consistency and
finality), then must still be held to ideals of the rule of law, ideals of anti-discrimination, nonarbitrariness, and sincerity. When pardoning decisions fail to adhere to these ideals, they are
morally problematic, even when taken one by one they have good and sufficient reasons behind
them.
C. Two Important Qualifications
I should be clear what the implications of the above are by making two qualifications.
The first qualification is that the constraints placed by non-ideal theory still leave considerable
room for pardoning. We can pardon all those we have good and sufficient reasons for pardoning,
provided that we do so with minimal bias (no overt racism or favoritism or randomness). Of
course there is not total room; at some place the constraints of ideal theory have to kick in. This
leads to my second qualification: even when the constraints do kick in, there may be some cases
where we decide that those constraints, too, must be abandoned. We might decide, that is, that
the present injustice is so great that even ideal theory has to give way, and that the force of the
reasons underlying the individual pardons outweigh the fact that the pardon is arbitrary, or racist,
or insincere.
There has been a growing chorus over the past two decades that the pardon power has
been used too sparingly by executives, especially the President. This chorus has practically
grown to a roar over the number of pardons granted by Obama, one of the lowest of any
President’s term. 119 George W. Bush has also been criticized on this score. I join my voice to
this chorus: given the present injustice of the status quo there are many, many pardons that not
only can be made for good and sufficient reasons, but ought to be made.
So my conclusions in the previous sections of this paper should not be taken as a
condemnation of the pardon power; far from it. As I elaborated in Part I, I believe that there is a
powerful moral case for the pardon power. What I showed in Part II is only that there are limits
to the pardon power not only in the individual case, but when we consider (individually justified)
pardons as a whole. This raised the possibility that an executive’s pardons on-the-whole might
be morally unjustified.
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But this is not the last word. For the answer to objections about problematic on-thewhole pardons is an obvious one: it is not to not pardon at all but to level up. 120 That is, instead
of refusing to pardon because of fear of arbitrarily pardoning, one should, if anything, be more
generous in granting pardons especially given the pervasive injustice in America’s criminal
justice system. 121 In the case referenced above, about the two roughly situated individuals, one
who evaded taxes, and the other who committed tax fraud, the answer to the question of which
should be pardoned is relatively easy: pardon both of them. Generally, it does not seem the case
that one arbitrary pardon renders many legitimate pardons illegitimate. It is only when, in cases
such as Barbour’s one gets the sense that nearly all of the pardons were granted on arbitrary
basis, that the problem of arbitrary pardons arises. Moreover, there are types of seeming
randomness, that can reflect acceptable (or at least morally neutral) types of selectivity, such as
budget pressures. 122
But then, of course, there are cases like Barbour’s, where there is a question of whether
the pardons can be justified en masse. We might even say that, if Barbour leveled up this time
around – pardoning not just trusties, but others on the pardon board’s list – he had not leveled up
enough. There were still more, similarly situated convicts who merited consideration for a
pardon. So in his case, I have suggested, the arbitrariness, and possibly discriminatory nature of
his pardons was enough to make all of this pardons problematic. He might have done many
individual good acts, but there was something about the acts, taken together, that was morally
questionable.
So this leads us to the question: Is there reason to think that with Barbour’s pardons, the
values of non-arbitrariness, non-discrimination, etc., should have outweighed the “good and
sufficient reasons” Barbour had for pardoning? There is a strong case to be made that, yes, they
should have. Sometimes the values of ideal theory should outweigh justice in individual cases,
especially when the value of that justice is relatively minor.
For consider: most of the sentences Barbour commuted were already served out; most of
those who were suffering from their crimes were no longer suffering from the sentences per se,
but from the stigma of their crimes. As Barbour hastened to point out, he freed very few people
from prison. 123 The value that would actually come from the pardon would be mostly be in
terms of avoiding the stigma (and associated harms) of conviction, and not avoiding the harm of
unjust imprisonment; the person who had finished his term of years would now no longer be
considered a “felon” in the eyes of the law thanks to Barbour’s pardons. In these cases, we
should say: the ideals of ideal theory should win out, because the injustices, the individual
injustices, that would be cured are relatively minor, and the violation of the values of consistency
and fairness seemed patent. (Of course, that does not make them any less injustices, nor does it
mean that the best thing for Barbour to have done would have been to pardon more people.)
Then we get to the cases that made up most of my examples, where the death sentences
of some were reduced to life in prison, but not all of those who were similarly situated. Is the
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answer to this to not pardon any of them, and let them all be put to death? Should the value of
consistency win out even here? 124 Certainly, this would not be the favored outcome: the favored
outcome would be that none of them should be put to death. But then we have to ask, what if
this outcome (for whatever reason) is unavailable? Does that mean that the second best option
(to pardoning some) is that all should not be pardoned? This sounds like a harsh, even
unacceptably harsh, result. Arbitrary pardons in this case might be the true “second best.”
Better that some avoid death than all face the death penalty.
In the death penalty debate in the 1970s, the arbitrariness (and racial selectiveness of the
death penalty) was hotly debated: those who were against the death penalty vigorously argued
that the randomness of the death penalty was a strong reason against it. 125 But they faced the
reply that if this was so, then the remedy was equally to give more people the death penalty
rather than to abolish the penalty altogether. 126 I do not want to get into the particulars of this
debate, but to note the similarity to the question above: one on side were those favoring the rule
of law values of consistency and fairness, up against those who favored the substantive justice of
the death penalty in individual cases. Of course, in this case, the rule of law values were
supported by the death penalty opponents, and the substantive justice values by the proponents.
But the structure of the debate seems similar to the question we are facing: in the case of the
conflict, what should win, the substantive justice or the procedural values?
There may be no general answer to this question in some extreme cases, of which the
death penalty cases must surely be. My point in the use of the examples in the second Part was
to point where the use of pardons could be morally problematic, and not morally prohibited.
Racism, favoritism, and arbitrariness seem to me to be strong reasons to question the justice of a
punishment, whether this is a case of a punishment being imposed or a punishment being
removed. This is why it still seems to me that in the race case, the awfulness of the
discriminatory message sent by pardoning only whites might be sufficient to trump the
substantive injustice (if it is one) of execution. 127 Might.
V. Conclusion
Over the years there have been many proposals from both practitioners and academics to
remove the pardon power from the executive, or at least reduce it, and give the power to an
independent board or commission.128 I am not sure this will happen, nor am I sure that it
necessarily should: boards would mean greater delays in pardons, something which is not always
good; boards might also mean fewer pardons, and more bureaucratic delay, as there might be
disagreement about who ought to be pardoned or who should be pardoned first. Executive power
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has always, historically, meant the power for quick action, whether for good or for bad. I think
pardoning is a place where quick action can often be desirable and necessary, and the best
remedy. Some of the delay in recent pardons is due to too many layers of review, too much
bureaucracy, too many hands in the pot.
But if we are going to favor quick action, this means we need to be even clearer on the
moral constraints that operate on the pardon power. Nor does solving the question of who should
pardon get us any clearer in specifying what the ground rules for pardoning should be. Wherever
the pardoning power resides, this paper has described an important additional moral check on
that power. The power should not be considered good or bad only in its individual instances, but
also when we look at the pardons over time and as a whole. That is, we should look at patterns,
not just at cases -- because pardons can be wrong not just in individual instances, but also when
we consider them in groups.
More generally, this paper has proposed a framework for evaluating what we might call
“discretionary acts of justice” throughout the criminal justice system, and not only in the
executive. Those acts, too, should be looked at in terms of whether they are, broadly speaking,
consistent with an ideal theory of criminal justice. Do they help us bring about that ideal, in a
way that reflects the values of that ideal? Or do they violate those values? Actors within the
criminal justice need to be mindful, not just of how they act in this or that case, but what legal
virtues they display over time and across many cases.
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